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Conspiracy theories are ubiquitous when it comes to explaining political events and soci-
etal phenomena. Individuals differ not only in the degree to which they believe in specific
conspiracy theories, but also in their general susceptibility to explanations based on such
theories, that is, their conspiracy mentality. We present the Conspiracy Mentality Ques-
tionnaire (CMQ), an instrument designed to efficiently assess differences in the generic
tendency to engage in conspiracist ideation within and across cultures.The CMQ is available
in English, German, and Turkish. In four studies, we examined the CMQ’s factorial struc-
ture, reliability, measurement equivalence across cultures, and its convergent, discriminant,
and predictive validity. Analyses based on a cross-cultural sample (Study 1a; N =7,766) sup-
ported the conceptualization of conspiracy mentality as a one-dimensional construct across
the three language versions of the CMQ that is stable across time (Study 1b; N =141).
Multi-group confirmatory factor analysis demonstrated cross-cultural measurement equiv-
alence of the CMQ items. The instrument could therefore be used to examine differences
in conspiracy mentality between European, North American, and Middle Eastern cultures.
In Studies 2–4 (total N =476), we report (re-)analyses of three datasets demonstrating the
validity of the CMQ in student and working population samples in the UK and Germany.
First, attesting to its convergent validity, the CMQ was highly correlated with another
measure of generic conspiracy belief. Second, the CMQ showed patterns of meaning-
ful associations with personality measures (e.g., Big Five dimensions, schizotypy), other
generalized political attitudes (e.g., social dominance orientation and right-wing authori-
tarianism), and further individual differences (e.g., paranormal belief, lack of socio-political
control). Finally, the CMQ predicted beliefs in specific conspiracy theories over and above
other individual difference measures.
Keywords: conspiracy theories, conspiracy mentality, generalized political attitudes, psychometric instrument,
measurement equivalence, cross-cultural research
“Other centuries have only dabbled in conspiracy like ama-
teurs. It is our (the Twentieth) century which has established
conspiracy as a system of thought and a method of action”
(Moscovici, 1987, p. 153).
INTRODUCTION
Belief in conspiracy theories continues to thrive in the twenty-first
century. In Western cultures, recent popular conspiracy theories
have revolved – among other themes – around the perpetrators
(and possible knowing bystanders) of the 9/11 attacks on the
World Trade Center in New York (Stempel et al., 2007; Swami
et al., 2010), the deaths of Princess Diana (Douglas and Sutton,
2008), and Osama bin Laden (Wood et al., 2012), and the scien-
tific evidence for climate change (Leiserowitz, 2006). These new
conspiracy theories take their place next to“classics”such as alleged
plots concerning the assassination of John F. Kennedy (McHoskey,
1995), the cover-up of alien contact (Harrison and Thomas, 1997),
or the origins of diseases such as HIV (Ross et al., 2006).
There is increasing evidence that there are stable individual
differences in people’s tendency to believe in such conspiracy the-
ories; if a person believes in one conspiracy theory, he or she
will also be more likely to believe in other conspiracy theories
(Swami et al., 2010). In fact, this tendency even extends to beliefs
in mutually contradictory conspiracy theories, and to beliefs in
fully fictitious conspiracy theories. Thus, those who believe that
Princess Diana faked her own death are also more likely to believe
that she was murdered (Wood et al., 2012); those who believe in
“real-world conspiracy theories” (i.e., that John F. Kennedy fell
victim to an organized conspiracy) are more likely to believe that
there was a conspiracy behind the success of the Red Bull energy
drink – a conspiracy theory that was purposely developed for a
social psychology study (Swami et al., 2011).
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This has led some researchers to propose that the endorsement
of specific conspiracy theories depends to a large extent on individ-
ual differences in the general tendency to adopt such beliefs, that
is, a general conspiracy mentality (Imhoff and Bruder, in press).
This term was originally phrased by Moscovici (1987) who under-
stood the notion of conspiracy as implying “that members of a
confession, party, or ethnicity [. . .] are united by an indissoluble
secret bond. The object of such an alliance is to foment upheaval
in society, pervert societal values, aggravate crises, promote defeat,
and so on.” (p. 154). As such, a conspiracy mentality then describes
the general propensity to subscribe to theories blaming a conspir-
acy of ill-intending individuals or groups for important societal
phenomena or, in more abstract terms, the tendency to subscribe
to “general conspiracist beliefs” (Swami et al., 2010). Usually, such
theories contradict common explanations and allege that these
events are caused by secret plots by groups of powerful individu-
als. Individual differences in conspiracy mentality have important
consequences as they predict prejudice against powerful societal
groups (Imhoff and Bruder, in press). Consequences of this may
either be intentions to engage in political action designed to under-
mine the perceived conspiracy (Imhoff and Bruder, in press) or – if
the conspiracy is perceived to be overpowering – political dis-
engagement (Butler et al., 1995). Further, conspiracy beliefs are
powerful predictors of critical health behaviors such as adher-
ence to medication regimens (Bogart et al., 2010) and vaccination
uptake (Kata, 2010).
There have been a number of initial efforts to measure individ-
ual differences in conspiracy mentality (sometimes called “con-
spiracist ideation”; Swami et al., 2011), the most prominent of
which is Swami and colleagues’ Belief in Conspiracy Theories
Inventory (BCTI; Swami et al., 2010, 2011). This consists of 15
items measuring beliefs in specific conspiracy theories (e.g., “A
powerful and secretive group, known as the New World Order,
are planning to eventually rule the world through an autonomous
world government, which would replace sovereign governments.”)
and has been used in the UK and continental Europe (Swami et al.,
2011) as well as East Asia (Swami, 2012). The internal reliability of
this scale has consistently been very good and it relates in meaning-
ful ways to other individual difference variables such as: support
for democratic principles, political cynicism, negative attitudes to
authority, and low agreeableness (Swami et al., 2011).
However, scales measuring beliefs in specific conspiracy the-
ories are closely bound to specific temporal and geographical
contexts. In response to these limitations, it has been suggested
that there is a need to assess the general tendency to believe in
conspiracies in a way that is not dependent on the cultural famil-
iarity of selected theories (Brotherton, French, and Pickering; in
press) and also independent of knowledge about specific conspir-
acy theories which may vary between cultures. For example, it is
unlikely that the BCTI item concerning the New World Order is
equally familiar in all countries around the world. Hitherto, there
have been two attempts to address this challenge, however, neither
explicitly address the cross-cultural validity of the measurement
instruments. First, Brotherton et al. (in press) have developed
a 15-item Generic Conspiracist Beliefs Scale on the basis of an
exploratory factor analysis of 75 items. They were able to dif-
ferentiate between five major components of generic conspiracy
beliefs: governmental conspiracies, extraterrestrial conspiracies,
informational control conspiracies, personal well-being conspir-
acies, and malevolent global conspiracies. These dimensions are
also reflected in the final scale. Second, Imhoff and Bruder (in
press) developed a 12-item Conspiracy Mentality Scale. The items
of this instrument not only avoid mentioning any specific alleged
conspiracy, but also do not name any specific groups that may be
responsible for a conspiracy (example item: “Most people do not
recognize to what extent our life is determined by conspiracies
that are concocted in secret”). Both the authors of the Generic
Conspiracist Beliefs Scale and the Conspiracy Mentality Scale pro-
vide initial evidence for the convergent and discriminant validity
of their instruments. However, neither scale has been validated in
non-Western cultures and so far neither scale has been adopted by
researchers other than the original authors.
We believe that these activities attest to the scientific relevance
of developing valid, reliable, and efficient instruments to mea-
sure generic conspiracy beliefs. In this context, we will propose
the Conspiracy Mentality Questionnaire (CMQ), a short (5-item)
measure of generic conspiracy beliefs that we administered in a
large (N = 7,766) international study spanning North American
(US), Western European (UK and Ireland; Germany), and Mid-
dle Eastern (Turkey) cultures (see Study 1a). The cross-cultural
dimension has so far been largely absent from research on con-
spiracy theories (for a notable exception examining the UK and
Austria, see Swami et al., 2011). Developing that dimension would
be highly desirable because it is likely that individual characteris-
tics and cultural factors interact when it comes to the belief in
specific conspiracy theories, and its consequences on attitudes
and behaviors. In particular, a number of studies have shown
that subcultures within national groups are differentially prone
to belief in conspiracy theories. For example, African Ameri-
can and Latino communities in the US are particularly likely to
endorse conspiracy theories claiming that HIV was spread to
extinguish specific ethnic groups (Ross et al., 2006). Connect-
ing these findings with research looking at individual differences
in the propensity to believe in conspiracy theories is a promis-
ing endeavor – even more so when extending the perspective
to different cultures around the globe. At the global level, con-
spiracy theories have been identified as a driving factor in the
discourses of conflict in the Middle East (Pipes, 1998). Again,
identifying how such broader societal phenomena relate to, and
interact with, individual characteristics constitutes a worthwhile
future research agenda. Our scale is designed to facilitate such
future efforts.
OVERVIEW AND HYPOTHESES
In Study 1a, we explore the factorial structure, assess the internal
consistency, and test the measurement equivalence of the CMQ
across its three language versions (English, German, Turkish).
Study 1b tests the temporal stability of the CMQ across a 2-week
interval. In Study 1a and three subsequent studies, we then exam-
ine the validity of the scale in predicting beliefs in 33 specific
conspiracy theories. Further, in Studies 2–4, we test the convergent
and discriminant validity of the construct of conspiracy mental-
ity compared to other generalized political attitudes [right-wing
authoritarianism (RWA), social dominance orientation (SDO)],
personality measures (Big Five, schizotypy, paranoid ideation),
and further individual differences measures (e.g., domains of
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paranormal belief, power-, and control-related self-perceptions,
anomia, death anxiety).
On the basis of the pertinent literature we expect that conspir-
acy mentality will evince reliable correlations with many of these
constructs. In particular, conspiracy mentality should be positively
related to instruments gauging perceptions of low socio-political
power (Abalakina-Paap et al., 1999) and anomia (Goertzel, 1994),
paranoia and schizotypy (Grzesiak-Feldman and Ejsmont, 2008;
Holm, 2009), paranormal belief (Ramsay, 2006), RWA (Adorno
et al., 1950), and the personality dimensions of agreeableness (neg-
atively) and openness to experience (positively) (Swami et al., 2010,
2011). At the same time, we expect that none of the correlations
will reach a level that would cast doubt on the viability of con-
spiracy mentality as an independent construct. In addition, we
hypothesize that conspiracy mentality will be the strongest and
most consistent predictor of specific beliefs in conspiracy theories,
even when controlling for other individual difference measures.
STUDY 1A
Study 1a is the largest data collection to date measuring both beliefs
in specific conspiracy theories and the general tendency to believe
in conspiracy theories across four (groups of) countries: the US,
UK, and Ireland, Germany, and Turkey. It allowed us (a) to exam-
ine the internal reliability and item loadings of the CMQ, (b) to test
measurement equivalence of the instrument across three different
language versions, (c) to investigate mean differences in conspir-
acy mentality across cultures as well as sex differences, and (d) to
use the CMQ to predict the belief in specific conspiracy theories.
METHODS
Participants
Participants initially were recruited by solicitation e-mails to par-
ticipants in prior online studies conducted by the first author and
by posting the study on sites listing online studies (e.g., Reips and
Lengler, 2005; Kathryn Gardner’s onlinepsychresearch.co.uk and
John H. Krantz’ Psychological Research on the Net). The study
proved highly popular and the link spread further through social
networking sites, online groups and forums, and links in relevant
articles of mainstream media outlets.
A total of 7,766 volunteers responded to 38 items measur-
ing participants’ belief in conspiracy theories. 1.2% (n= 93) of
the submissions were excluded due to (a) repeated submissions
from one computer, (b) identical responses to all items, (c) self-
reported poor command of the questionnaire language, or (d)
missing responses to more than one questionnaire item. Further,
(e) we only included participants with valid data on the five items
measuring participants’ conspiracy mentality (see below). This
resulted in a final sample of N = 7,673 participants (4,919 men,
2,694 women, 60 unreported) between the age of 18 and 67 years
(M = 29.1, SD= 10.2). Participants’ were resident in Germany
(n= 5,018), the US (n= 1,126), Turkey (n= 981), or the UK and
Ireland (n= 548).
Materials and procedure
When arriving on the study website, participants could choose
between one of three language versions (English, German, or
Turkish). They then received a very broad and non-judgmental
definition of the term conspiracy theory :
“A conspiracy theory is a theory that provides an alternative
explanation to the established understanding of a historical
or current event. Often, it is claimed that this event is the
result of conscious manipulations by individuals or secretive
powers. Due to our incomplete knowledge about the world,
it can usually not ultimately be decided which explanatory
model is true – the established understanding of an event or
the respective conspiracy theory.”
We further informed participants that we were interested in their
personal beliefs in such theories. Participants then provided demo-
graphic information and proceeded to the main questionnaire
page starting with the following instructions: “For each of the
statements below, please use the respective rating scale to indicate
how likely it is in your opinion that the statement is true. Remem-
ber that there are no “objectively” right or wrong answers and that
we are interested in your personal opinion.”
The 38 items administered in this study [dubbed the Conspir-
acy Theory Questionnaire (CTQ) by Darwin et al., 2011] con-
tained 33 items measuring the belief in specific conspiracy theories
and five items assessing participants’ general tendency to believe in
conspiracies or their conspiracy mentality. We refer to these latter
five items as the CMQ (see Appendix for complete item wording).
The items included in the study were either adapted from exist-
ing ad hoc scales assessing beliefs in conspiracy theories (e.g.,
Goertzel, 1994; Abalakina-Paap et al., 1999; Sjörberg, 2002) or
developed drawing on the content of websites and online forums
dedicated to conspiracy theories. Items assessing the belief in spe-
cific conspiracy theories covered, for example, conspiracies con-
cerning assassinations (e.g., “Princess Diana’s death was an assas-
sination rather than an accident.”), alien landings (e.g., “There are
specialized government services who attempt to harass UFO wit-
nesses into silence.”), technological developments (e.g., “A cure
for most forms of cancer has already been found, but medical
circles prefer to continue to extract research funding from gov-
ernments and keep their findings secret.”), and secret activities
of powerful organizations (e.g., “The Vatican Bank in Rome has
close links to the Mafia.”). The five items assessing participants’
conspiracy mentality consisted of general statements capturing a
conspirational view of world events.
Participants indicated on 11-point scales how likely they
thought each item to be true from 0 (0% – certainly not ) to 10
(100% – certain). Each scale point was additionally labeled with
increasing probabilities in steps of 10 percentage points.
The original English items were translated into German and
Turkish in a procedure similar to that proposed by Brislin (1970):
Each item was first translated by a native speaker of the respec-
tive language and then translated back into English by a different
person competent in both languages. Disagreements between the
original and the backtranslated version and their implications
for the translated version were resolved by discussion. In total,
n= 5,026 participants completed the German version, n= 1,640
the English version, and n= 1,007 the Turkish version of the
questionnaire.
After completing the questionnaire, participants had the oppor-
tunity to compare their own score with that of a normative sample,
were debriefed, and thanked for their support.
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Statistical analyses
Rather than being taken for granted, tests should be employed
to determine whether a different language version of one ques-
tionnaire measures the same construct in an equivalent manner
across different cultures (see Geisinger, 1994; van de Vijver and
Hambleton, 1996; Hambleton, 2005). As a first step, we explored
the factorial structure of the five items across the full sample
and within each language version using principal component
analyses.
Second, we tested for measurement equivalence (ME; also mea-
surement invariance or metric invariance) across the three language
versions. The focus here was on the invariant operation of the items
and, in particular, on equivalent factor loadings across groups
(Byrne, 2008, 2010). Using SPSS AMOS (Version 20), we con-
ducted a multi-group confirmatory factor analysis and compared
a configural model without constraints with a second model, in
which factor loadings were constrained to be equal across groups.
The second model is computed by freely estimating parameters
for the first group and then constraining factor loadings for the
other groups to be equal to those of the first one. Measurement
equivalence can therefore be assumed if, through comparison,
the models are deemed to be equally fitting of the data as this
implies that the additional constraints did not substantially reduce
model quality. Statistical testing for measurement equivalence is
sometimes based on the comparison of each model’s χ2 values;
however, this is a highly conservative method and is often seen
as “impractical and unrealistic”(Byrne, 2009). When, as is the
case in our analyses, the sample size is large, this often leads to
statistically significant χ2 differences, even in case of negligible
differences between the two models. We thus follow recommen-
dations in the relevant literature and also compare changes in
other fit indices between the unconstrained and the constrained
model as a second source of information to evaluate measure-
ment equivalence. In particular, we examined the comparative fit
index (CFI), the Tucker–Lewis-Index (TLI), and the root mean
square error of approximation (RMSEA). According to Hu and
Bentler (1999), a cut-off value of 0.95 for CFI and TLI, and a
value of less than 0.06 for RMSEA indicate a good model fit.
For the RMSEA, values of up to 0.08 are still considered to indi-
cate reasonable model fit (Browne and Cudeck, 1992) and values
between 0.08 and 0.10 are considered to reveal mediocre fit (Mac-
Callum et al., 1996). PCLOSE provides a one-sided test of the null
hypothesis that RMSEA equals 0.05. PCLOSE-values larger than
0.05 indicate that the null hypothesis is not rejected – the model
is then described as a “close fitting” model (Kenny, 2012). For
changes in CFI and TLI values (∆CFI, ∆TLI) in the context of
examining measurement or structural equivalence (SE), Cheung
and Rensvold (2002) proposed that only differences larger than
0.01 should lead one to reject the assumption of measurement
equivalence. For ∆RMSEA, Chen (2007) recommended that only
a difference of > 0.015 should lead to a rejection of measurement
equivalence.
Testing the cross-cultural measurement properties of a psycho-
metric scale can be extended to tests of SE. Here, the focus is on the
unobserved (or latent) variables. Tests of SE can be used to check
whether the factorial structure of a measurement instrument is
the same across groups (Byrne, 2009).
RESULTS
Descriptive statistics
Item statistics (mean values, standard deviations, and item dis-
crimination coefficients) for each of the five CMQ items for each
of the language versions are presented in Table 1. Each of the three
language versions had good (German: α= 0.84; English: α= 0.84)
or acceptable (Turkish: α= 0.72) internal consistency and very
good to medium item discrimination statistics (r itc > 0.37).
Factorial structure and model fit
We first conducted an exploratory factor analysis across all partic-
ipants to examine the factorial structure of the CMQ. The screen
plot criterion suggested a one-factor solution explaining 60.6% of
the variance. All factor loadings were larger than 0.71. Repeating
this analysis for each language version separately also suggested
a one-factor solution for each language version (see Figure 1).
However, the proportion of explained variance was lower for the
Turkish-speaking sample (50.3%) than for the German-speaking
(61.0%) and English-speaking (61.2%) samples. Except for one
item, all items strongly loaded on the extracted component (indi-
vidual factor loadings were larger than 0.69 across all language
versions). The one exception was the item “I think government
agencies closely monitor all citizens” in the Turkish CMQ version
with a still acceptable loading of 0.54.
Measurement equivalence across language versions
Using multi-group confirmatory factor analysis, we proceeded to
test a one-factor model across the three different language ver-
sions. In this configural model, there were no constraints imposed
on the parameters in the model; however, there was the mini-
mal requirement that the number of factors and the number of
items associated with each factor are equal across groups. Thus,
this model tests whether the one-factor structure observed in
the exploratory analyses can be confirmed when taking all three
groups into account simultaneously.
As expected for our large sample, χ2 values were significant.
However, examining alternative fit indices revealed very good
model fit (see Table 2) with the CFI and the TLI being larger
than 0.95 and the RMSEA smaller than 0.05. PCLOSE indicated a
close fitting model. Thus we proceeded to tests of more restrictive
models.
In the measurement equivalence model, factor loadings were
constraint to be equal across groups. Apart from the significantχ2
value, this model showed very good model fit which was highly
similar to that of the unconstrained model. Again, the CFI, TLI,
and RMSEA were within a value range that is generally accepted
to indicate very good fit (see Table 2) and PCLOSE remained
non-significant. In addition, the changes in all of these values
between the configural model and the measurement equivalence
model were minimal, all within a range supporting ME (Cheung
and Rensvold, 2002; Chen, 2007). Thus, the CMQ is of equivalent
measurement quality across all of its three language versions.
Building on the confirmatory results concerning measurement
equivalence, we proceeded to test the SE of the CMQ across the
three language versions. This is done by constraining both factor
loadings and factor (co) variances to be equal across groups. The
SE model showed acceptable model fit with both the CFI and the
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Table 1 | Conspiracy Mentality Questionnaire item statistics for each of the three language versions.
No. Item German version English version Turkish version
M SD ritc M SD ritc M SD ritc
1 I think that many very important things happen in the world,
which the public is never informed about
8.04 2.37 0.63 8.00 2.14 0.62 8.84 1.53 0.48
2 I think that politicians usually do not tell us the true motives
for their decisions
7.48 2.32 0.55 8.12 1.85 0.56 8.68 1.48 0.46
3 I think that government agencies closely monitor all citizens 3.35 2.94 0.60 3.90 2.93 0.62 3.72 2.72 0.37
4 I think that events which superficially seem to lack a
connection are often the result of secret activities
4.59 2.93 0.72 4.69 2.72 0.70 6.97 2.28 0.65
5 I think that there are secret organizations that greatly
influence political decisions
6.22 3.09 0.73 6.54 2.80 0.74 8.23 1.89 0.57
ritc =Corrected-Item-Scale-Correlation.
nGerman =5,026, nEngllish =1,640, nTurkish = 1,007.
FIGURE 1 | Screen plot for exploratory factor analysis for each of the
three language versions (Study 1a).
RMSEA falling within the range of well-fitting models and the
TLI only falling very slightly short of the value of 0.95 (Hu and
Bentler, 1999). Comparing the SE model with the less restrictive
ME model revealed acceptable invariance only when using differ-
ences in RMSEA to assess model equivalence. These differences
were minor (∆RMSEA=−0.012) and within the suggested range
(Chen, 2007). However, both changes in the CFI and the TLI are
somewhat larger than would be expected for equivalent models
(∆CFI= 0.018; ∆TLI= 0.020). Inspection of the model modifi-
cation indices showed that removing the constraint on the latent
factor variance for the Turkish group to be equal to that of the two
other groups would have resulted in a better fitting model. Indeed,
such a model was highly similar to the measurement equivalence
model with ∆CFI= 0.001,∆TLI< 0.001, and ∆RMSEA< 0.001.
Thus, although the measurement properties of the individual
items of the CMQ are stable across language versions, questions
remain as to whether the latent construct of conspiracy mentality is
as coherent in Turkey as in Western European and North American
countries.
Differences in mean levels of conspiracy beliefs
Having established that our five item measure operates well in all
three language versions, this allowed us to investigate between-
country differences in conspiracy mentality. We used a one-way
ANOVA with Tukey HSD post hoc tests to examine mean differ-
ences between countries and independent groups t -tests to test sex
differences between men and women in each country (Bonferroni-
corrected α= 0.0125). Previous research in different disciplines
suggests that conspiracy beliefs may be particularly rife in the
Near East (e.g., Zonis and Joseph, 1994; Pipes, 1998; Gray, 2010)
and we thus hypothesized that our Turkish sample would show
higher mean scores than the samples from Western Europe and
the US. As far as sex is concerned, Darwin et al. (2011) reported
no significant differences. However, our larger sample allowed us
to re-examine the idea that women may be more prone to believe
in conspiracy theories than men. This may be because women
are structurally disadvantaged in many societies and powerless
individuals and groups are more susceptible to conspiracy beliefs
(Abalakina-Paap et al., 1999). Furthermore, women are more likely
to believe in paranormal phenomena (Irwin, 1993), a tendency
that in itself is linked to higher conspiracy beliefs (Darwin et al.,
2011).
Regarding differences in conspiracy mentality across the four
countries, the ANOVA showed a significant main effect, F(3,
7669)= 120.32, p< 0.001, η2p = 0.045. Tukey HSD follow-up
comparisons revealed significant group differences between each
pair of countries, ps< 0.01, except for the comparison between
the US (M = 6.3; SD= 2.0) and UK/Ireland (M = 6.3; SD= 1.9),
p= 1.00. Turkish participants’ (M = 7.3; SD= 2.1) conspiracy
mentality was markedly higher than that of all other groups
(ds> 0.58) whereas German participants scored lower than the
other groups (M = 5.9; SD= 2.1). However, effect sizes of mean
differences between Germany, the US, and the UK were small,
|ds|< 0.20.
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Table 2 |Tests for measurement and structural equivalence of the conspiracy mentality questionnaire across the three language versions
(English, German, andTurkish).
χ2 df ∆χ2 ∆df CFI ∆CFI TLI ∆TLI RMSEA PCLOSE ∆RMSEA
No constraints imposed 288.07*** 15 – – 0.980 – 0.960 – 0.049 0.655 –
Measurement equivalence 347.01*** 23 58.94*** 8 0.976 0.004 0.969 −0.009 0.043 0.998 0.006
Structural equivalence 603.07*** 25 256.06*** 2 0.958 0.018 0.949 0.020 0.055 0.016 −0.012
CFI= comparative fit index; TLI=Tucker-Lewis-Index; RMSEA= root mean square error of approximation. ***p<0.001.
As far as sex differences are concerned, the only significant
effect was observed for the US, t (1119)= 3.40, p= 0.001, d = 0.20,
with women (M = 6.5; SD= 1.9) scoring slightly higher than men
(M = 6.1; SD= 2.1).
In sum, the mean comparisons supported our contention that
the susceptibility to believe in conspiracy theories is more pro-
nounced in Near Eastern countries (i.e., Turkey) than in Western
countries (Germany, UK/Ireland, US). In line with Darwin et al.’s
(2011) findings, we also did not observe strong support for sys-
tematic sex differences, although the findings revealed that the
hypothesis of women’s greater tendency to belief in conspiracy
theories held in our US sample (despite a small effect size).
Predicting specific conspiracy beliefs
We also tested the extent to which conspiracy mentality as mea-
sured by the CMQ predicts endorsement of each of the 33 specific
conspiracy theory items also included in the questionnaire. The
CMQ correlated strongly with each of the specific conspiracy
items, with correlations ranging from 0.37 to 0.76, each signifi-
cant at a level of p < 0.001. The average correlation coefficient was
r¯ = 0.58, obtained by averaging Fisher’s z transformed correlation
coefficients (StatSoft Inc., 2012).
STUDY 1B
Study 1b examined the 2-week test-retest reliability of the CMQ.
METHOD
The German version of the CMQ was administered twice at the
end of an otherwise unrelated study. The time lag between the
invitations to the two assessments was 15 days. All participants
were members of a German university. Of 177 participants who
completed the CMQ at t1, 75% or 133 participants (82 women, 50
men, 1 unidentified; MAge= 24.27, SDAge= 5.21) also completed
assessment at t2. Dropout was independent of CMQ scores at t1,
t (175)= 1.07, p= 0.28.
RESULTS
Internal consistency of the 5-item CMQ was satisfactory both at
t1 (α= 0.77) and t2 (α= 0.82). The correlation between the two
assessment points was 0.84.
SUMMARY STUDIES 1A AND 1B
Study 1a established the factorial structure and internal consis-
tency of a new 5-item psychometric instrument – the CMQ –
designed to measure the general tendency to believe in conspiracy
theories that characterizes a conspiracy mentality. It further pro-
vided support for measurement equivalence of three different
language versions of the CMQ (English, German, and Turkish). As
far as SE was concerned, there remained some doubts as to whether
a one-factorial structure can adequately capture the construct of
a “conspiracy mentality” in Turkey. Comparisons of mean levels
of conspiracy mentality revealed higher levels in Turkey than in
Western European and North American countries. Sex differences
were small with the only significant sex effect showing higher lev-
els of conspiracy mentality among US women than men. Study 1b
demonstrated satisfactory test-retest reliability of the CMQ over a
2-week interval.
STUDY 2
Studies 2–4 are concerned with the convergent and discriminant
validity of the CMQ with other individual differences measures.
Study 2, a focused re-analysis of data presented by Darwin et al.
(2011) examined the relations between conspiracy mentality as
assessed by the CMQ and (a) people’s tendency to belief in
paranormal events, (b) paranoid ideation, and (c) a schizotypal
personality disposition. A tendency to believe in the paranormal
manifests itself in the acceptance of events and processes that
accepted science currently deems impossible; paranoid ideation is
characterized by fears and suspicions about physical and psycho-
logical threats potentially posed by social agents; and schizotypy
is a mild form of schizophrenia that involves suspicion, magical
thinking, paranoid beliefs, and different forms of social anxi-
ety. All three of these constructs have been theoretically and
empirically linked to beliefs in conspiracy theories (Ramsay, 2006;
Grzesiak-Feldman and Ejsmont, 2008; Holm, 2009; Darwin et al.,
2011).
METHOD
Participants
The sample consisted of 120 students (60 men and 60 women)
of a university in the UK. All participants were between 18 and
30 years of age. One female participant was excluded because of
missing values needed for the computation of the CMQ score.
Materials and procedure
After obtaining participants’ informed consent, four question-
naires were presented in random order. First, the study contained
the same 38 items as Study 1a assessing (a) participants’ conspiracy
mentality (CMQ; α= 0.85) and (b) their beliefs in specific con-
spiracy theories using the same 11-point response scales. Second,
the Paranormal Belief Scale (PBS; Tobacyk and Milford, 1983)
measures seven factors of paranormal belief (traditional religious
belief, psi beliefs, witchcraft, superstition, spiritualism, extraordi-
nary life forms, and precognition) using 25 items. Participants
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indicated the extent to which they agreed with each statement on
a 5-point scale (1= strongly disagree, 5= strongly agree). Third,
the Paranoid Ideation Scale (PIS; Fenigstein and Vanable, 1992)
consists of 20 statements and measures paranoid experiences and
beliefs. Participants indicated the extent to which they agreed
with each item on a 5-point scale (1= not at all applicable to me,
5= extremely applicable to me). Fourth, the Schizotypal Person-
ality Questionnaire (SPQ; Raine and Benishay, 1995) consists of
22 items with three subscales: cognitive-perceptual deficits (eight
items), interpersonal deficit (eight items), and disorganization (six
items). The SPQ measures the DSM-defined schizotypal person-
ality disorder. Items are answered using a yes vs. no response
format.
RESULTS
Correlations with individual difference measures
Following the original approach by Darwin et al. (2011), we com-
puted partial correlation coefficients (controlling for participants’
sex) between participants’ self-reported conspiracy mentality and
their tendency to engage in paranoid ideation, to hold paranormal
beliefs, and their schizotypal personality disposition (see Table 3).
Conspiracy mentality was strongly (0.40< r < 0.50) associated
with paranoid ideation and the total score of the PBS (mainly
driven by a strong correlation with psi beliefs). There were also
significant medium-sized correlations with all SPQ subscales. The
superstition and precognition subscales of the PBS were not sig-
nificantly correlated with the CMQ. No correlation of any subscale
with the CMQ was larger than rp= 0.50.
Predicting specific conspiracy beliefs
We again tested the extent to which participants’ conspiracy men-
tality predicted each item measuring belief in a specific conspiracy
theory. Replicating results of Study 1a, all specific conspiracy
beliefs were significantly predicted by the CMQ with correlations
ranging from 0.30 to 0.81 (all ps< 0.001). The average correlation
coefficient was r¯ = 0.55.
As a next step, we tested whether the association between con-
spiracy mentality and specific conspiracy beliefs remained stable
when controlling for paranormal belief (with its seven subscales),
paranoid ideation, and schizotypy (three subscales). Because all
12 predictors (including the CMQ) were substantially correlated,
we used a stepwise regression procedure to avoid problems of
multicollinearity. Each time a new variable was entered into the
model (inclusion criterion p< 0.05), the significance of already
entered variables was re-examined. If any p-values then exceeded
the exclusion criterion of p > 0.10, the predictor with the highest
p-value was removed before refitting the model. This procedure
was repeated until no further variables met the inclusion or exclu-
sion criterion. In 30 of 33 regressions, the CMQ explained the
largest part of the variance (0.29< β< 0.81; averageβ= 0.53). The
remaining three specific conspiracy beliefs included two items con-
cerning alleged cover-ups of alien contact. For both these items,
the psi beliefs subscale of the PBS was the strongest predictor
(βs= 0.38 and 0.35) followed by the CMQ (βs= 0.32 and 0.30)
and no other significant predictors. Finally, the allegation that the
US Apollo program never landed on the moon was again most
strongly predicted by psi beliefs (β= 0.24) as well as the religious Tab
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belief subscale of the PBS (β= 0.21). The CMQ remained a mar-
ginally significant predictor with β= 0.18, p= 0.050. Apart from
the psi beliefs and superstition subscales of the PBS, which signifi-
cantly predicted belief in five specific conspiracy theories, no other
predictor significantly added explained variance to more than two
specific conspiracy beliefs.
SUMMARY
Study 2 took a first step in placing conspiracy mentality as assessed
by the CMQ within a wider nomological network of other rele-
vant constructs. CMQ scores showed substantial correlations with
scales measuring paranoid ideation and schizotypal personality.
They were also associated with several aspects of paranormal belief.
Although these correlations demonstrate that conspiracy mental-
ity is related to other constructs in meaningful and predictable
ways, none of the correlations was of a size that would raise doubts
as to whether conspiracy mentality is viable as an independent con-
struct. As in Study 1a, conspiracy mentality was a reliable predictor
of beliefs in specific conspiracy theories, although the tendency to
believe in psi phenomena also reliably predicted conspiracy beliefs
concerning space flight and alien contact.
STUDY 3
Study 2 recruited a sample of students from a British university.
The strong reliance on young and highly educated student sam-
ples to develop psychometric scales and test psychological theories
has been much discussed and criticized (Peterson, 2001; Henrich
et al., 2010). Thus, in Study 3 we recruited a sample drawn from the
British working population. In addition to replicating the internal
structure of the CMQ and its association with paranoid ideation,
Study 3 also aimed at confirming the association between con-
spiracy mentality and schizotypy using a different measure of a
schizotypal personality disposition.
METHOD
Participants
An opportunity sample of 76 full-time employes (mainly in the
insurance and financial industry; no students) participated in the
study. One male participant had to be excluded because of miss-
ing data on the 5-item CMQ. The final sample consisted of 28
men and 47 women between the age of 22 and 54 years (M = 31.3;
SD= 8.1).
Materials and procedure
Participants completed the following self-report scales: First, they
responded to the same 38 items assessing conspiracy beliefs as
in the previous two studies. The 5-item CMQ again proved reli-
able (α= 0.73). They then indicated their agreement (yes vs. no)
with the items of two subscales of the Oxford-Liverpool Inventory
of Feelings and Experiences (O-LIFE; Mason et al., 1995). The
30 items of the “Unusual Experiences” subscale refer to positive
symptoms of a psychosis (e.g., hallucinatory and magical thinking)
whereas the 23 items of the “Cognitive Disorganization” subscale
describe difficulties in the areas of attention, concentration, and
decision-making, as well as a sense of purposelessness, moodiness,
and social anxiety. Finally, they completed the Paranoid Ideation
Scale (PIS; Fenigstein and Vanable, 1992) already used in Study 2.
RESULTS
Correlations with individual difference measures
We calculated correlation coefficients between participants’ con-
spiracy mentality as measured by the CMQ and their tendency
to make unusual experiences (r = 0.53), to be cognitively disorga-
nized (r = 0.42), and to engage in paranoid ideation (r = 0.50; all
ps< 0.001).
Predicting specific conspiracy beliefs
As in the two previous studies, we computed zero-order correla-
tion coefficients between participants’ conspiracy mentality and
their belief in 33 specific conspiracy theories. We again tested the
extent to which participants’ conspiracy mentality predicted each
of the items measuring the belief in a specific conspiracy theory.
Again, all specific conspiracy beliefs were significantly predicted
by conspiracy mentality (all ps< 0.05) with correlations ranging
from 0.20 to 0.69. The average correlation coefficient was r¯ = 0.50.
As in Study 2, we conducted 33 stepwise regression analyses
to examine the predictive validity of conspiracy mentality when
controlling for other individual differences measures. In 28 of 33
regressions, the CMQ was the strongest predictor for the belief
in specific conspiracy theories (0.26< β< 0.69; average β= 0.47),
followed by the PIS (predicting five conspiracy beliefs with βs
between 0.21 and 0.30) and the O-LIFE subscale Cognitive Disor-
ganization (predicting four conspiracy beliefs withβs between 0.21
and 0.28). For three specific conspiracy belief, PIS (βs= 44. and
0.41) and Cognitive Disorganization (β= 0.30) were the strongest
predictors, followed by the CMQ (βs= 0.31, 0.27, and 0.29, respec-
tively). The former two conspiracy beliefs are concerned with the
complexity of terror networks and the government’s ability to
uncover individual choices in parliamentary elections. The lat-
ter belief is concerned with the withholding of cures for cancer to
further extract research funding. For the item stating that better
car engines have already been developed but are not being made
commercially available, the O-LIFE subscale Unusual Experiences
was the only significant predictor (β= 0.27, p= 0.02). Finally, the
item alleging the deliberate spread of HIV among minorities was
not significantly related to any of the predictors (ps> 0.26).
SUMMARY
Study 3 replicated the findings of Study 2 with respect to the asso-
ciation between conspiracy mentality and paranoid ideation and
schizotypy in a non-student sample. Again, as expected, conspir-
acy mentality was found to be substantially related to both of
these constructs, but not identical to them. As before, conspir-
acy mentality did well in predicting beliefs in specific conspiracy
theories.
STUDY 4
In Study 4 we reanalyzed data presented by Imhoff and Bruder
(in press) to address four main goals: First, we wanted to test the
convergent validity of the CMQ with another validated measure
of generic conspiracy beliefs. Second, we wanted to examine its
discriminant validity with a broader set of more fundamental per-
sonality characteristics and generalized (political) attitudes. Third,
we wanted to replicate the predictive validity of the CMQ for spe-
cific conspiracy beliefs in another national and language context
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(Germany instead of the UK). Fourth, we wanted to provide a
more severe test of the CMQ’s predictive validity by controlling
for a large set of individual difference measures when predicting
specific conspiracy beliefs.
METHOD
Participants
The original data collected by Imhoff and Bruder (in press) con-
sisted of 280 participants, recruited via an e-mail list of a German
university. Six participants were excluded due to missing values
on the 5-item CMQ (α= 0.78). The data subjected to re-analysis
therefore comprised 96 male and 178 female participants aged 16
to 69 years (M = 25.6; SD= 8.1).
Materials and procedure
Participants in this study first rated 32 social groups on their levels
of perceived power, likeability, and realistic and symbolic threat.
For detailed analyses of these ratings, see Imhoff and Bruder (in
press).
Participants then completed the 5-item CMQ as well as the
same 33 specific conspiracy belief items as were used in Stud-
ies 1–3. In addition, they responded to the following individual
difference measures:
1. Conspiracy Mentality Scale: This is a 12-item measure
(α= 0.89) of generic conspiracy beliefs. Items were either
adapted from the existing literature (Adorno et al., 1950) or
purpose-designed for the study. Items (e.g., “Those at the top
do whatever they want”) were rated on 7-point scales ranging
from do not agree to fully agree.
2. Right-wing authoritarianism was measured using Funke’s
(2005) 12-item scale covering conventionalism, authoritarian
aggression, and authoritarian submission (α= 0.81; example
item: “The withdrawal from tradition will turn out to be a fatal
fault one day.”).
3. Social dominance orientation was assessed with the German
adaptation (von Collani, 2002) of the original 16-item Social
Dominance Orientation scale (Pratto et al., 1994; α= 0.89;
example item: “To get ahead in life, it is sometimes necessary to
step on other groups.”).
4. Perceptions of control in the personal (α= 0.61), interper-
sonal (α= 0.79), and socio-political (α= 0.70) domains was
measured using Paulhus (1983) Spheres of Control scale. Exam-
ple item: “Even when I’m feeling self-confident about most
things, I still seem to lack the ability to control social situations”
(interpersonal control).
5. Perceptions of powerlessness were measured using a scale con-
sisting of seven items that were partly taken from the literature
and partly purpose-designed (α= 0.70; e.g., “The problems of
life are sometimes too big for me”).
6. Anomia is a concept that describes the perception that the
complexity of modern societies has become unintelligible. The
construct was measured using a 7-item scale (α= 0.74). Exam-
ple item: “Things have gotten so confusing that nobody really
knows what is what anymore.”
7. Death anxiety was assessed using the five highest-loading items
(items 2, 3, 12, 14, 18) of the first factor of the Revised Death
Anxiety Scale (RDAS; Thorson and Powell, 1992; α= 0.92;
example item: “The idea of never thinking again after I die
frightens me”).
8. Anthropomorphism, the tendency to attribute human-like
characteristics such as agency to inanimate objects (e.g., “To
what extent does a television set experience emotions?), was
measured using the 15-item Individual Differences in Anthropo-
morphism Questionnaire (IDAQ; Waytz et al., 2010; α= 0.89).
9. Big Five personality dimensions were assessed using the Big
Five inventory (BFI-K; Rammstedt and John, 2005; exam-
ple item: “I am rather reserved, shy”). This scale con-
sists of 21 items assessing extraversion (α= 0.85), agree-
ableness (α= 0.59), conscientiousness (α= 0.69), neuroticism
(α= 0.79), and openness to experience (α= 0.73).
RESULTS
We computed partial correlations (controlling for participant sex)
between the CMQ and every other individual difference measure
(see Table 4). Attesting to the convergent validity of the CMQ, it
was very highly correlated with the Conspiracy Mentality Scale
(r = 0.82, p< 0.001). A medium-size correlation also emerged
with anthropomorphism (r = 0.36, p < 0.001) and RWA (r = 0.28,
p < 0.001). Small-to-medium correlations (all |rs|< 0.25) also
existed with powerlessness, anomia, social dominance orientation,
perceived socio-political control, and agreeableness. As could be
expected, the former three of these were positively related to con-
spiracy mentality, whereas the latter two were negatively related to
conspiracy mentality. The remaining measures were not reliably
associated with the CMQ.
Predicting specific conspiracy beliefs
We again examined the extent to which the CMQ predicted each
of the 33 specific conspiracy beliefs and – in line with the previ-
ous findings – found medium-sized to strong correlations, rang-
ing from 0.32 to 0.68 (all ps< 0.001). The average correlation
coefficient was r¯ = 0.50.
Once again, we also conducted 33 stepwise regression analyses
regressing specific conspiracy beliefs simultaneously on the CMQ
and all other individual difference measures included in the study
(apart from the Conspiracy Mentality Scale). For all 33 items, the
CMQ remained the most powerful predictor of specific conspiracy
beliefs with βs ranging from 0.31 to 0.65 (average β= 0.46). Of the
other individual difference measures, the most powerful predictors
of specific conspiracy beliefs were (a) RWA (predicting 18 con-
spiracy beliefs with average β= 0.17) and (b) anthropomorphism
(predicting nine conspiracy beliefs with average β= 0.16). The Big
Five dimensions, SDO, and perceived personal, interpersonal, and
socio-political control did not systematically predict specific con-
spiracy beliefs (all subscales were significant predictors of less than
five beliefs with all |βs|< 0.19).
SUMMARY
Study 4 attested to the convergent validity of the CMQ. In partic-
ular, it was very highly correlated with the Conspiracy Mentality
Scale, a measure that has been shown to meaningfully predict
socio-political attitudes (Imhoff and Bruder, in press). Further
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indication of convergent validity came from substantial corre-
lations with anthropomorphism and RWA. Anthropomorphism
refers to the tendency to assume human-like tendencies in inan-
imate objects. Although not obvious at first sight, such a ten-
dency might be related to conspirational thinking as both types
of thinking styles assume agency where there may be none, like
intentionality in a TV set or secret activities of conspirators in
the absence of good evidence for such activities. As for RWA, the
original conceptualization of RWA (Adorno et al., 1950) included
a construct called projectivity which is closely related to our con-
ceptualization of a conspiracy mentality. The relevant subscale of
the California F-Scale of authoritarianism (Adorno et al., 1950)
included items such as “Most people don’t realize how much our
lives are controlled by plots hatched in secret places.”
Study 4 also demonstrated the discriminant validity of the CMQ
in that all correlations with other individual difference measures
were not at a level that shed doubt on the conceptualization of
conspiracy mentality as an independent construct. In particular,
notwithstanding the meaningful correlation with RWA, neither
RWA nor SDO as the two major generalized political attitudes
showed more than a medium-sized correlation with the CMQ.
Also, the only (negative) association between the CMQ and the
Big Five personality dimensions was observed for agreeableness
(see Swami et al., 2011, for convergent findings); this correlation
was reliable but only small in size.
The study also provided good evidence for the predictive validity
of the CMQ: the instrument strongly predicted specific conspir-
acy beliefs even when controlling for other individual difference
measures. The predictive power of the scale was upheld even in
another national and language context.
DISCUSSION
The main purpose of our analyses was to examine the factorial
structure and internal consistency, the measurement equivalence
across cultures, and the validity of the 5-item CMQ – a psy-
chometric instrument designed to assess individual differences in
conspiracy mentality.
Regarding the factorial structure of the CMQ, our data were
consistent with the assumption that conspiracy mentality – at its
core – constitutes a one-dimensional construct. In each of the Eng-
lish, German, and Turkish language versions, exploratory factor
analyses strongly suggested a one-factor solution with satisfactory
loadings of all individual items; accordingly, internal consistency
of the scale was adequate in all studies. This is consistent with the
fact that longer instruments are able to identify subscales of generic
conspiracy beliefs. Brotherton et al. (in press) Generic Conspiracist
Beliefs Scale does just that by differentiating between conspiracy
theories related to government malfeasance, extraterrestrial cover-
up, control of information, etc. In order to successfully identify
subscales, the instrument must contain a sufficient number of
items with relatively specific information about possible perpe-
trators and topics of conspiracies without explicitly referring to
any existing conspiracy theory. This approach comes with dan-
gers. First, any specification of content-related aspects such as the
topic of the conspiracy (e.g.,“New and advanced technology which
would harm current industry is being suppressed”; Brotherton
et al., in press) renders cross-cultural comparisons more difficult.
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For example, whereas in some countries the transition from old
to new technologies may simply be a matter of market forces,
in other countries new technologies may actually be suppressed
for political or economic ends. Although an item such as the one
by Brotherton et al. (in press) above may be a good indicator of
conspiracy mentality in the former type of country (e.g., democ-
racies), answers to this item may reflect appropriate skepticism
and low gullibility rather than conspiracy mentality in the lat-
ter type of country (e.g., autocracies). Second, any specification
of content-related aspects makes a scale more susceptible to the
influence of current political events (e.g., the Fukushima Daiichi
disaster in 2011 may have temporarily or lastingly changed atti-
tudes toward some new technologies in certain countries but not
others). Thus, although there is doubtlessly substantial benefit in a
fine-grained assessment of conspiracy beliefs, we suggest that there
are also benefits in a short generic measure focusing on the cen-
tral construct of conspiracy mentality. The two approaches should
therefore be considered as complementary. As Brotherton et al. (in
press) have themselves argued, for most purposes, it will be suffi-
cient to establish an overall score measuring the tendency to engage
in conspiracist ideation. The CMQ provides a highly economical
instrument to do just that, for which measurement equivalence
has been established across markedly different cultures. Brother-
ton et al. (in press) Generic Conspiracist Beliefs Scale, instead,
may be better suited for exploring domain-specific differences in
conspiracy beliefs. However, its measurement and SE have yet
to be established before it can be used in non-English-speaking
countries.
Our analyses concerning the measurement equivalence of the
CMQ across its three language versions provided initial support
for the idea that it is possible to assess conspiracy mentality across
different cultures. In fact, constraining item loadings to be equal
across language versions did not substantially reduce model fit.
Thus, items “function” equally well in English-, German-, and
Turkish-speaking contexts despite some questions as to whether
the construct of conspiracy mentality is as well captured by a
one-dimensional scale in a Turkish context than in the other two
contexts. This finding illustrates the potential complementarity
of our measure with other, more detailed and culture-dependent
measures of conspiracy beliefs. Our scale helped to identify a
need to examine the structure of conspiracy beliefs in the Mid-
dle East using more extensive measures such as the one developed
by Brotherton et al. (in press). Study 1a also provided support
for the utility of the CMQ in describing mean differences in con-
spiracy beliefs. At a cross-cultural level, Turkish participants were
more prone to believe in conspiracy theories than participants
from Western countries (Germany, UK/Ireland, US), who did not
systematically differ in their conspiracy mentality. This is con-
sistent with suggestions that conspiracy beliefs are particularly
rife in the Middle East (e.g., Pipes, 1998). Within cultures, we
observed that women in the US, but not in the other countries,
scored higher on conspiracy mentality than did men. This is a
powerful reminder that even research focusing on sex differences
does well in examining men and women in more than one cul-
ture before claiming to have uncovered “essential” (rather than
culture-specific) differences between the sexes.
Our studies provide ample evidence for the convergent, dis-
criminant, and predictive validity of the CMQ. Study 4 showed
that it is closely associated with the Conspiracy Mentality Scale
(Imhoff and Bruder, in press), a measure that has been shown
to meaningfully predict intergroup and political attitudes. Fur-
ther evidence for the convergent validity of the scale comes
from meaningful predicted correlations with other generalized
political attitudes (RWA, social dominance orientation), person-
ality measures (schizotypy, paranoid ideation, agreeableness), and
further individual differences measures (e.g., most domains of
paranormal belief, anomia, anthropomorphism, perceptions of
powerlessness and lack of socio-political control). Beyond these
associations, there exist a plethora of potentially meaningful
and important relationships to other constructs. For example,
recent articles discussed the influence of uncertainty and percep-
tions of morality (Van Prooijen and Jostmann, 2013) as well as
the influence of anxiety-inducing situations (Grzesiak-Feldman,
2013) on conspiracist ideation. One may also want to explore
whether people with strong imaginative abilities (i.e., high fan-
tasy proneness or absorption) or those who are more susceptible
to outside influence (e.g., those high in hypnotic suggestibil-
ity) are more likely to believe in conspiracy theories, or whether
and in what way personality variables in general interact with
conspiracy mentality over time. However, these questions will
have to be addressed in future research. For the initial evalu-
ation of the CMQ, we purposely focused on those constructs
that have been mentioned in the literature on conspiracy beliefs
and ascertained that the CMQ relates to these constructs in
predictable ways.
The relationship between perceptions of control and conspir-
acy beliefs warrants some further discussion. Conspiracy beliefs
have long been linked to low levels of societal power and con-
trol. For example, those threatened by unemployment as well as
ethnic minorities are more likely to believe in conspiracy theories
(Goertzel,1994;Abalakina-Paap et al., 1999). Consistent with these
findings, we also observed a negative association between conspir-
acy mentality and perceived socio-political control as well as a
positive association between conspiracy mentality and anomia.
However, in our data there was no relationship between conspir-
acy mentality and lack of personal or interpersonal control despite
recent evidence that inducing perceptions of low personal control
also increases the attribution of ambiguous events to conspiracies
(Whitson and Galinsky, 2008; Kay et al., 2009). We argue that the
difference lies in the functionality of conspiracy beliefs that differs
between our correlational design and experimental designs such
as Whitson and Galinsky’s (2008) due to differences in attribution.
For experimentally induced control deprivation, beliefs in conspir-
acies constitute an opportunity to engage in compensatory action:
Seeing the plot behind the curtains helps to regain a sense of con-
trol. We argue that the situation is different for self-reported low
levels of personal control that are predominantly internally attrib-
uted (as measured, e.g., by the item “It’s pointless to keep working
on something that’s too difficult for me” of Paulhus’, 1983, Spheres
of Control scale). Here, adopting a belief about how others secretly
try to gain control over the world would not constitute a functional
way of regaining a sense of control, precisely because this lack
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of control is internally attributed. If own failures were externally
attributed (e.g., if there was an item stating “Others confront me
with much harder tasks than my competitors”), endorsing conspir-
acy beliefs may be functional in regaining feelings of control (“I
am not incompetent, rather, ill-intending individuals are against
me”). The same logic applies to the Spheres of Control subscale
of interpersonal control that also targets internally attributed lack
of control (e.g., “I’m not good at guiding the course of a conver-
sation with several others”). However, this is markedly different
for the subscale tapping into socio-political control which explic-
itly introduces attributions to external causes (e.g.,“Bad economic
conditions are caused by world events that are beyond our con-
trol”). Thus, it should be expected that conspiracy mentality as a
stable generalized political attitude (Imhoff and Bruder, in press)
is related to levels of socio-political control but not to momentary
fluctuations in perceived personal or interpersonal control. Indeed
this is what we observed.
Although conspiracy mentality relates to a large number of
individual difference measures in meaningful ways, none of these
correlations reaches a level that casts doubt on its viability as an
independent construct. In particular, whereas the CMQ’s corre-
lation with the Conspiracy Mentality Scale was 0.82, all other
correlations were smaller than 0.54 (most of them substantially
so). Critically, the CMQ fared very well – and much better than
any other of the individual difference measures – in predicting
beliefs in specific conspiracy theories even when controlling for a
large number of alternative predictors. Only a minority of specific
conspiracy theories could not be predicted well. Again, this may
hint at the role of situational factors in determining the degree
to which people (at the time of data collection) believed in these
specific theories. This underlines the need to integrate research on
situational factors determining endorsement of specific conspiracy
beliefs with stable individual differences in conspiracy mentality.
We argue that our findings build a convincing case for the suit-
ability and utility of the CMQ as a measure of conspiracy beliefs.
However, we recognize that the present studies have their limita-
tions. First, our samples were not representative of the general pop-
ulation of the different countries, and any generalization should
therefore proceed with caution. However, one should note that
we made an effort to recruit diverse participant samples to avoid
relying on highly specific subgroups of the population (Henrich
et al., 2010). In particular, samples differed in terms of partici-
pants’ professions (e.g., students in Studies 2 and 4 and employees
in Study 3) as well as in cultural background (Western Europe,
Middle East, and North America). Further, Study 1a is – with
over 7,500 participants – one of the largest available data collec-
tions on a broad range of items assessing both generic and specific
beliefs in conspiracy theories in a cross-cultural context. Similarity
in recruitment methods across cultural groups resulted in com-
parable group compositions in terms of key socio-demographic
characteristics, thus allowing for at least tentative between-country
comparisons concerning the absolute level of conspiracy mental-
ity. We are aware that the difference in sample size across the four
studies (ranging from N = 76 to N = 7,766) may appear inconsis-
tent. However, on close inspection the results reveal high levels of
consistency of findings across the different studies. For example:
(1) despite the differences in sample size, age, and professions
between Studies 2 and 3, the CMQ scores are highly similar in
terms of means and standard deviations. Further, (2) the corre-
lation between the Paranoid Ideation Scale and the CMQ are of
similar strength across the two studies (r = 0.45 and 0.50). (3)
The findings concerning the CMQs predictive validity are highly
consistent throughout all four studies. The average correlation of
the CMQ with all specific conspiracy theory items always ranged
between 0.50 and 0.58. More importantly – as stated above – the
CMQ consistently turned out to be the strongest predictor for
the belief in specific conspiracy theories across all studies, despite
controlling for a broad range of other potential predictors. Second,
we are aware of the fact that our scale is not completely free from
content-related aspects. For example, the item“I think government
agencies closely monitor all citizens” does provide more specific
information than the item “I think that events which superficially
seem to lack a connection are often the result of secret activities.”
This difference may be responsible for the fact that the former
item showed a comparatively low factor loading in the Turkish
language version. Although we acknowledge that this potential
problem must be carefully monitored when extending the use
of the scale to further, possibly non-democratic, countries, the
level of content provided still allowed for measurement equiv-
alence across the language versions. Lastly, an instrument with
items not mentioning any actors or possible topics of conspiracies
runs the danger of not adequately capturing the construct. Thus,
in our view, the distinction between scales measuring generic and
specific conspiracy beliefs is not as clear cut as one may initially
suspect. In particular, “generic” scales will usually have to provide
some level of specific content to render the assessment of a con-
spiracy mentality meaningful. Our scale, we suggest, qualifies as a
comparatively generic measure able to efficiently assess the gen-
eral tendency to believe in conspiracy theories in a cross-cultural
context.
CODA
There is much reason to think that there is no return to what
Moscovici (1987) describes as the amateur stage of conspiracy
beliefs. To the contrary, an increasingly fast-paced political process
characterized by frantic political and economic competition is
bound to generate a number of competing theories proclaiming
to explain certain societal phenomena and events. The internet
is a powerful communication tool that even allows theories to
proliferate that in former times may not have passed the fil-
ter of mainstream media; and conspiracy theories seem ubiqui-
tous in many cultural contexts. Whether presidential candidates
are blamed for covering their real birth place or whether out-
side powers are blamed for civil unrest in autocratic countries
like Syria – conspiracy beliefs permeate political and societal
processes. Being able to reliably assess the general tendency to
endorse such theories with the CMQ should help to guide the
next steps in the exciting endeavor to better understand the psy-
chological role of such beliefs in social change and individual life
courses.
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APPENDIX
CONSPIRACY MENTALITY QUESTIONNAIRE (CMQ)
Note: Response formats for each item in the respective language can be found beneath item wordings.
English
I think that . . .
1 . . . many very important things happen in the world, which the public is never informed about.
2 . . . politicians usually do not tell us the true motives for their decisions.
3 . . . government agencies closely monitor all citizens.
4 . . . events which superficially seem to lack a connection are often the result of secret activities.
5 . . . there are secret organizations that greatly influence political decisions.
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
certainly
not
extremely
unlikely
very
unlikely
unlikely somewhat
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German
Ich denke. . .
1 . . . es geschehen viele sehr wichtige Dinge in der Welt, über die die Öffentlichkeit nie informiert wird.
2 . . . Politiker geben uns normalerweise keine Auskunft über die wahren Motive ihrer Entscheidungen.
3 . . . Regierungsbehörden überwachen alle Bürger genau.
4 . . . Ereignisse, die auf den ersten Blick nicht miteinander in Verbindung zu stehen scheinen, sind oft das Ergebnis
geheimer Aktivitäten.
5 . . . es gibt geheime Organisationen, die großen Einfluss auf politische Entscheidungen haben.
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Turkish
Bana göre. . .
1 . . . dünyada halka hiç bir sekilde haber verilmeden gerçekles¸en çok fazla sayıda önemli olaylar olmaktadır.
2 . . . siyasetçiler, genellikle, kararlarının altında yatan gerçek nedenleri bizlere açıklamazlar.
3 . . . hükümet ajanları bütün vatandas¸ları yakından izlemektedir.
4 . . . yüzeysel olarak ele alındıg˘ında bag˘lantısız gibi görünen olaylar aslında çog˘unlukla gizli aktivitelerin sonucudur.
5 . . . siyasi kararları büyük ölçüde etkileyen gizli kurulus¸lar vardır.
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